conserve deep-rooted anti-democratic tendencies underneath the surface?
Alternatively, did it readily engage with the Nazi past and transform into a vibrant democracy? Or, do these issues require differentiated answers that reflect failures, shortcomings as well as success? Thomas Kühne is in no doubt that the Nazi past was always present in the public life of Germany. However, he is also quick to point out that one has to distinguish carefully what aspects of the Nazi period and its aftermath In countries that were dominated by Nazi Germany the discourse about the war focused on a small number of well-known agents of Nazi rule, the trauma suffered under Nazi occupation (Austria complained of having been the first victim of Nazi aggression), resistance (France, Poland), partisan warfare (Yugoslavia), or the 'great war of the fatherland' (Soviet Union) -all of which served as tools to integrate and legitimise their respective post-war societies. The painful and divisive issue of widespread collaboration, a crucial component of how the occupiers were able to establish their rule, and the role of local agents in the persecution of the Jews and other minorities, was swept under the carpet and received little attention. 6 Additionally, research on the Holocaust in the Eastern Bloc was strongly ideologized before it became more or less insignificant. 7 Considering the continuity in personnel in more or less all sectors of West German society after the defeat of the 'Third Reich' and the fact that many Germans had been perpetrators, accomplices or bystanders, it cannot be a surprise that most
Germans were not keen on dealing with the topic of perpetrators, and kept secret or minimized the crimes of the past. 8 More than anything else, the Nuremberg Trials of War Crimes shaped the way in which perpetrators were dealt with and the discourses on perpetrators and memory in West Germany in the post-war period. Following the debates concerning the responsibilities for the crimes, only the Gestapo and the SS were classified as 'criminal organisations' whilst regular police, plainclothes police and the Wehrmacht successfully escaped the mantra of guilt: whilst Himmler's black corps was demonized, it isolated the crime institutionally and allowed large parts of the population to exonerate themselves from any guilt (according to Gerald Reitlinger, the SS became the 'alibi of a nation' 9 ). Even Eugen Kogon, a Holocaust survivor and one who was highly critical of the way how most Germans denied any guilt, in his influential book The SS-State (the German edition had been published in 1947)
described Hitler and his SS-henchmen as failed characters who suffered from inferiority complexes and were in 'naked pursuit of power':
What we are dealing with here are not baffling mysteries of human nature, but violations of simple, basic, psychological laws in the evolution of inferior minds. It was inferiority -whether of minds, reason, willpower, imagination or the numerous social aspects of the human mind -that led these men into the SS. 10 Other important developments also shaped collective perceptions and the specific discourse on perpetrators. Otto Ohlendorf, the leader of Einsatzgruppe D, claimed BABEL: And how is it that they were carried out regardless of these scruples?
OHLENDORF: Because to me it is inconceivable that a subordinate leader
should not carry out orders given by the leaders of the state … HERR BABEL: Could any individual expect to succeed in evading the execution of these orders?
OHLENDORF: No, the result would have been a court martial with a corresponding sentence.
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This line of argument reduced perpetrators to mere executioners of an alien will steered by Hitler, Himmler and Heydrich (who were all dead but were treated as principal offenders) and emphasised that any resistance would have had deadly consequences. This defence strategy quickly became commonplace and helped many accused to go unpunished especially after 1949 when German courts judged the overwhelming majority of killers as 'assisting' in murders which they as individuals apparently did not want. 12 This interpretation turned the bearers of terror into victims of terror -i.e. ordinary Germans were prisoners of a specific historical period and structures and were condemned to obedience. 13 The representation of female perpetrators and their defence strategy in various Nazi trials is a largely neglected topic but played an important part of the collective strategy of denying any guilt. 14 Riga or the mass gassings in Auschwitz. In this way, the process of mass murder was construed as a series of secret events that occurred in specially cordoned-off zones in 'the east' to which no witnesses were granted access. 16 Perpetrator historiography uncritically followed the interpretation that blame and responsibility for the Holocaust lay with a few top Nazi leaders, in particular Hitler. interpreted the Shoah as a process of successive steps that were initiated by countless decision-makers inside a vast bureaucratic apparatus that was operating and coordinating on an unprecedented scale. 31 This bureaucratic machinery was driven by a shared comprehension, synchronisation and efficiency, and was not limited by any morals because the process was dehumanised (e.g., the Commandant of Treblinka and
Sobibor, Franz Stangel, described the Jews as 'cargo'). According to Christopher
Browning, Hilberg's great contribution was to portray an extensive 'machinery of destruction' that 'was structurally no different from organized German society as a whole.' Indeed, 'the machinery of destruction was the organized community in one of its specialized roles.' Moreover, these bureaucrats 'were not merely passive recipients of orders from above' but 'innovators and problem solvers'. 32 However, Hilberg's overall focus on the bureaucratic process and the structure of extermination, emphasising the division of labour in the killing process, meant that there was still no detailed focus on the background and motivation of perpetrators. In other words, whilst Hilberg had put the perpetrator at the centre of his analysis and emphasised the involvement of a large number of groups in the killing process, his focus was on the role of perpetrators as members of an institution rather than as individuals. 33 The 1961 trial of Adolf Eichmann boosted discussions on the Holocaust. 34 The
trial is often associated with Hannah Arendt's famous book Eichmann in Jerusalem:
A Report on the Banality of Evil. published the autobiographical notes of Rudolf Höβ, commandant of Auschwitz, described an executioner who appeared to be a normal petit-bourgeois human who zealously and unemotionally obeyed orders from authorities and was part of a factorylike and anonymous mass murder. This new picture of perpetrators entailed that they
were not particularly evil, but orderly, conscientious, and thus appeared extremely suitable to take part in the anonymous mechanism of modern mass murder. A flood of publications described Eichmann's mediocre normality and depicted him as model example of the loyal bureaucrat -a cog in a machine that operated beyond his control -hence the description 'banal bureaucrat' and 'bureaucratic murderer'.
Authors from Israel in particular criticised Arendt's assessment that in the modern world all humans are potential Eichmann's and are not aware of the consequences of their actions. To some, this minimises the horrific crimes that were committed and gives them a universal character. To others, like Raul Hilberg, 'there was no "banality" in this "evil"' as Eichmann was not only a loyal bureaucrat but rather a trailblazer for continuously finding new ways in achieving the incredible dimension of his barbaric deed. Finally, Alf Lüdtke warned that by describing automatic processes without humans one re-affirms a widespread consensus amongst the perpetrator society that denied that each killing had to be carried out again and again by the will and action of the perpetrators. 37 Not surprisingly, Ulrich Herbert described this period as 'the second suppression of the past' in Germany. 38 Gerhard Paul argued that the Shoah turned into an 'automatism without people' that 'found its description in the metaphor of the "factory of death"': Auschwitz. This discourse did not deal with the activities of killers in shooting pits or the liquidations of ghettos, and enabled 'normal' Germans once more to distance themselves from the perpetrators.
There was, to be true, a widespread trend to conceptualise the Holocaust. These original studies on organisational, ideological, regional and biographical aspects of Nazism led to a much better understanding of the Nazis' policies of extermination and the role and motivation of perpetrators. For instance, Michael
Zimmermann demonstrated that the Nazi policy of persecution against the Romani 'drew on traditional anti-Gypsy prejudices, but managed to radicalize them at decisive points by representing them as scientifically sound with the aid of social and biological theories.' There was 'no evidence of a unified process of decision-making … nor of a corresponding chain of command for the murder of "Gypsies"' (more than 200,000 Gypsies were killed in the Holocaust). 47 Meanwhile, researchers abroad were also producing innovative studies. 48 53 ). Furthermore, with reference to Primo Levi he asked scholars to pay more attention to complex and contradictory aspects of human behaviour, i.e. the 'Gray Zone' of victims (e.g., the corruption and collaboration that flourished in the camps) and perpetrators (e.g., 'the pathetic figure' of commander Trapp, 'who sent his men to slaughter Jews "weeping like a child"'). 54 The controversy surrounding the 'Crimes of the Wehrmacht' exhibition and the 'Goldhagen debate' sparked off a massive public discussion about perpetrators.
Suddenly the spotlight was on locating killers and their motives at the heart of society, and the brutal suffering of victims. The public was confronted with the accusation that 'ordinary' Germans participated in systematic mass murder (previously, similar findings had not received much public reaction). The breaking of the 'visual taboo' regarding the Shoah made this situation even more dramatic. Whilst Goldhagen 69 At the heart of his explanation stands the concept of comradeship which was central to everyday social practices of the military community and its moral rules -and which entailed enormous pressures to conform.
It included the shared experience of being away from home, being accomplice in murder and then belonging to the 'community of suffering' when the war turned against Germany. Soldierly comradeship was the epitome of everything 'good'.
Kühne concludes: 'The "human" side of comradeship made the 'inhumane' side of war bearable, morally as well as emotionally', but it simultaneously functioned as the motor of violence as peer pressure made an opt-out extremely difficult.
The growing interest in women and the Holocaust and in the social environment of perpetrators led to the scholarly 'discovery' of the female perpetrators -until then an almost completely neglected topic. The 'feminist' Historikerstreit (struggle amongst historians) over whether women were victims of an extreme male-dominated and sexist-racist Nazi dictatorship that reduced women to the status of mere 'objects' (Gisela Bock), or whether women played an active role in the regime and shared some responsibilities for the crimes (Claudia Koonz) constructed an over-simplistic perpetrator-versus-victim dichotomy. 70 It is only more recently that studies about the personnel of perpetrator groups, in particular research about the 'euthanasia' killing and concentration camps, made visible the important and varied functions women fulfilled as perpetrators and bystanders in mass murder. 71 Female doctors, nurses, midwifes and administrative assistants directly or indirectly participated in the killing of innocent people in the Nazi 'euthanasia' programme. 72 Women worked as cooks, office personnel, nurses, laboratory assistants, doctors, and camp guards in women's divisions in some of the best-known concentration camps, such as AuschwitzBirkenau, Majdanek, Bergen-Belsen, Mauthausen, Dachau, and Sachsenhausen, and in numerous women concentration camps, such as Ravensbrück, Moringen and Lichenberg. In total, around 10 percent of all camp guards, i.e. 3,500, were female.
They participated in tormenting and torturing prisoners, and helped to select and murder victims. Female perpetrators pursued their work under no duress, regarded concentration camps as a normal place of work and the attached SS estate as a normal place to live in, and often perceived inmates as 'sub-humans' who had no right to live in the Nazi state. Gudrun Schwarz argued that SS-wives (240,000 women were married to SS men) were directly involved in the system of terror by providing domestic and emotional stability at the place of crime for the husbands, and by actively participating in the system of exploitation and robbing. Some wives of members of the SS or the Gestapo even volunteered to take part in encroachments and shootings. 73 Overall, female perpetrators worked as efficiently and professionally as their male counterparts to ensure a smooth killing process. They were not passive tools in the apparatus of repression but used their freedom to pursue personal initiatives.
Very recently an expert stated bluntly that 'the full history of wartime collaboration in much of eastern Europe remains to be written.' 74 However, scholarship has made considerable progress since the discourse about societies in Nazi-occupied territories hardly went beyond the description of stigmatized collaboration and heroic resistance. A discussion about the motives of non-German perpetrators exemplifies the complexities of the subject. Michael MacQueen argued that there were six basic motivations for, or types of, Lithuanian perpetrators:
1. Revenge, by those who had suffered at the hands of the Soviets.
2.
Careerists, who sought personal advancement under the new regime. micro-study of the crime and the killing. 78 He argued that most humans have the potential to turn into mass murderers. This happens through a process in which the majority group's feeling of solidarity towards a minority has vanished and systematic killing is not regarded as a crime but is desired.
Conclusions and future perspectives
Our knowledge and understanding of the Holocaust, the instruments of terror and their personnel, have made enormous progress over the last decade. 79 Perpetrator
Studies has established itself as new discipline within the broad topic of National Socialism and has contributed towards many innovative findings. 80 These studies aim to analyse the interaction between the structures of persecution, the bureaucracy of extermination, the (group) biography of perpetrators below the top Nazi leadership, the motivation of mass murderers beyond madness and racial hatred, the act of killing, and the time and place of killing. There were probably several hundred thousand Germans and Austrians who planned, organised, carried out and assisted persecution and murder. They were complemented by thousands of ethnic Germans (Volksdeutsche) who often pursued auxiliary functions, and hundreds of thousands of foreign auxiliaries. 81 The forms of persecution and murder, and the motivation behind them, were extremely broad. Typical, however, was the mixture of state-prescribed and individually initiated violence -forms of violence which were difficult to separate and mutually conditional -through which they received their particular power and dynamics. The latest research suggests that there were at least three periods of political socialisation that shaped a 'radicalising career': the violent völkisch-Nazi milieu in post-war Weimar (climate of hate, racist prejudice and glorification of violence), the integration into Nazi organisations and an internalisation of violence during the Nazi dictatorship after 1933 (turning 'pre-war extremists' into 'full-time Nazis'), and the terrorist milieu in the occupied territories after 1939 (cumulative radicalisation and violence with a de-inhibiting effect; socialisation in violent comradeship). Overall, research suggests that whilst disposition is more important among the 'architects' of genocide, the behaviour of the 'shooters' is more determined by situational factors. It is likely that the largest group of perpetrators only radicalised after 1939 into 'wartime Nazis'. However, the social psychologist Leonard Newman reminds us of the enormous complexities involved at any level: Personal and situational factors interact in complicated ways … Situations do not only interact with dispositional factors to affect behaviour, they also shape and change those dispositions: people do not just react to situations … and finally, 'situations' themselves do not even objectively exist but need to be cognitively constructed by the people they then go on to affect … While attitudes do indeed give rise to behavior, it is also the case that one's behavior affects one's attitudes and beliefs … The cognitive dissonance literature shows that when people are led to engage in behaviors that violate their normal standards, they will be motivated to change their attitudes and beliefs to reduce the discrepancy between their behaviour and their cognitions. 82 These and many other insights represent great achievements in Perpetrator Studies but cannot obscure the fact that the list of shortcomings, desiderata, and methodological problems remains daunting. 83 The importance of racist ideology, and in particular anti-Semitism, in the mass murder has reoccupied centre stage but remains disputed.
The core group of men who organised genocide were willing and committed ideologues. Furthermore, Christopher Browning now believes that the 'significant minority' of so-called 'eager-killers' amongst low-level perpetrators were ideologically motivated to kill Jews and not overtly influenced by 'situational/organization/institutional factors'. 84 However, among the majority of killers it is impossible to establish a direct causal relation between fanatical antiSemitism and actually killing Jews. Even the most committed racist ideologues, including Wildt's 'generation of the unbound', required a process of 'cumulative radicalization' 'to the point where they could actually comprehend that the most extreme conclusions of their ideas were realizable.' 85 Also, how exactly did moral scruples and human ethics disintegrate: was it, for example, a mixture of escalating pragmatism and social-Darwinist racism during a radicalising war? Or, did years of political and social indoctrination by the Nazis create a 'new moral conscience' that discarded universal human rights?
(endemic corruption and violent excess, particularly in the East) differ so much from that of the old Reich (bureaucratic inhumanity and measures of persecution). 87 Furthermore, George Browder raises a number of crucial questions that remain unanswered:
Were those who behave proactively at all levels 'normal' representatives of predominantly German (Nazi) sources and do not take into consideration the perspectives of the victims of genocide and occupation. 89 Furthermore, Jürgen
Matthäus has warned that whilst more and more researchers have studied (and at times have become obsessed with) the personalities of perpetrators, their crimes and the crime locations, 'the more we restrict our analysis to the incriminating act, the greater the risk of severing casual and chronological connections with other, no less relevant aspects of the past'. 90 Finally, the call by some historians for multi-causal interpretations based on multi-disciplinary approaches has only been partially attempted. However, social psychological explanations which concentrate on group dynamics (but are often ahistorical -i.e., they neglect specific historical conditions and cultural factors, including ideology -and have a tendency to down-play the responsibility of perpetrators) can provide essential additions to historical attempts to find answers to why normal people became mass murderers under Nazism. 91 Other serious challenges remain. There are still hardly any attempts for a systematic gender perspective in Perpetrator Studies, and it is necessary to reflect anew about the methodologies of how to write women's history under Nazism. It is not clear to what extent or whether at all the systematic investigations of their male counterparts are applicable to women. Susannah Heschel argues: 'there is a widely shared assumption that men's cruelty is, in part, an expression of masculinity, but no exploration into whether women's acts of cruelty are linked to expressions of their femininity, understanding both terms as social constructs.' 92 There are also difficult pedagogical tasks. In Germany, the gap between historical knowledge and the willingness to confront the past in ones' own immediate environment has not changed since Anna Rosmus became the 'nasty girl' of Passau for exploring Nazism in her home town in the early 1980s. In fact, there is a widespread acceptance throughout Western European societies today that Nazism was evil and collaboration was often as deadly, but, according to private family discourses, there were never any Nazis or Nazi sympathisers in ones' own family. On the contrary, according to family memories the whole of Europe was full of heroic resistance fighters. 93 The enormous reaction to the controversial book Neighbours. The Destruction of the Jewish Community in Jedwabne (Poland) from 2000/1 by the sociologist Jan Tomasz Gross exemplifies how difficult and sensitive the discussion of local collaboration in the Holocaust continues to be more than 60 years after the defeat of Nazism. 94 More generally, knowledge of the mass murder during the Nazi dictatorship has become so complex and multilayered that it is hardly of any pedagogical use. 
